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Social media and the Scottish Independence Referendum 2014: Events and the 
Generation of Enthusiasm for Yes1 
 
Mark Shephard and Stephen Quinlan 
 
Abstract 
We track the social media activity of the two main campaigns in the Scottish independence 
referendum, Yes Scotland (YS) and Better Together (BT), by monitoring their respective 
Facebook and Twitter accounts on weekdays from August 2013 until the referendum vote in 
September 2014. We explore the relationship between key events and online support and find 
that the Yes Scotland campaign pulled ahead of the Better Together campaign in terms of 
online enthusiasm (especially following the launch of the White Paper in November 2013), 
and that it accelerated exponentially in the closing weeks of the campaign as a number of 
events helped give it an advantage. Although further research is needed, it is interesting to 
note how this transformation in mobilisation online for Yes preceded big movements in 
support offline in the closing weeks. 
 
 
Social media and political campaigns: What we know and the new frontiers 
Ever since the 863UHVLGHQWLDOHOHFWLRQZKHQ%DUDFN2EDPD¶VFDPSDLJQGHPRQVWUDWHG
the potential of social media as a useful tool in political campaigning (Harfoush 2009), the 
use of social media by political campaigns has become more prevalent cross-nationally (e.g. 
Chen 2010; Lassen and Brown 2010; Gainous and Wagner 2011; Gibson and McAllister 
2011; Sudlich and Wall 2011; Vergeer et al. 2011; Ackland and Gibson 2013; Conway et al. 
2013; Vergeer and Hermans 2013). For politicians, social media offers a new means of 
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engaging supporters and also an alternative form of soliciting donations (Davis et al. 2009; 
Straw 2010; Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez 2011). We also know that social media has the 
capacity to mobilise people to participate politically (Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez 2011; 
Bond et al. 2012) and that it could even be a useful tool in helping predict election outcomes 
(Tumasjan et al. 2010, 2011; Sang and Bos 2012; DiGrazia et al. 2013; Ceron et al. 2014), 
although its ability to do the latter is contested (Jungherr et al. 2012). Moreover, considering 
its extensive usage by journalists and news organizations (Fahri 2009; Bruno 2011), social 
media has gained an increasingly prominent agenda setting capacity, illustrated at the 
extremes by the 2011 Irish Presidential election, which showed that posts on social media do 
have the propensity to alter voter behaviour and the result of an election in extreme cases 
2¶0DOOH\+RJDQDQG*UDKDP. In sum, with social media now such an integral 
part of daily life for many people (XUREDURPHWHU)ODVK3HZ5HVHDUFK&HQWUH¶V
Internet and American Life Project 2014) and many potential benefits accruing from a social 
media political presence, having some form of social media presence is almost a necessary 
component of a modern day campaign. 
 
,QVSLWHRIWKHDERYHUHVHDUFKRQVRFLDOPHGLD¶VLPSDFWRQSROLWLFVLVVWLOOUHODWLYHO\LQLWV
infancy.  In terms of adoption by candidates and politicians, we know that social media are 
more likely to be used by younger candidates (Lassen and Brown 2010; Strandberg 2013; 
Larsson and Kalsnes 2014), and more often than not, by newer parties and progressive parties 
(Gulati and Williams 2011; Vergeer and Hermans 2013). However, much of our 
understanding is based on analyses of elections. There has been very little analysis of social 
media during a referendum campaign, which is likely to be different given the idiosyncratic 
nature of referendums compared to elections. Unlike elections, with referenda there are only 
two sides competing for attention, one primary issue is at stake, and voters may be less likely 
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to be as embedded in their preferences than in a general election, thereby increasing the 
possibility of volatility (LeDuc 2002). Consequently, patterns of behaviour could indeed be 
different from those found during elections.  
 
,QGHHGH[SORUDWLRQVRIVRFLDOPHGLD¶VLPSDFWRQUHIHUHQGXPVDUHIHZDQGIDUEHWZHHQ7KH
little research that does exist has been focused on discussion of referendums in online forums 
and whether such conversations promote deliberation (Quinlan et al. 2015). But there has not 
yet been any in-depth focus on how social media plays out in a referendum campaign. 
Additionally, while most existing research on social media and campaigns has tended to 
explore the reasons underlying a FDPSDLJQ¶VDGRSWLRQDQGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKYRWLQJ
behaviour is influenced by engagement with these channels, an important dimension has 
remained largely unexplored, namely: the extent to which campaigns generate enthusiasm 
and support through these channels, and the patterns underlying this engagement. This 
chapter seeks to fill this void.  
 
The 2014 Scottish independence referendum provides a unique opportunity to explore the 
impact of social media as a campaign tool in a referendum. We do so by exploring the social 
media campaigns of the two official protagonists in the independence referendum debate, the 
µ<HV6FRWODQG¶<6FDPSDLJQZKLFKFDPSDLJQHGIRUDyes vote and in favour of Scottish 
LQGHSHQGHQFHDQGWKHµ%HWWHU7RJHWKHU¶%7FDPSDLJQZKLFK argued for a no vote, and 
DUJXHGIRU6FRWODQGUHPDLQLQJZLWKLQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP2XUIRFXVLVRQHDFKFDPSDLJQ¶V
use of two of the most popular forms of social media, Facebook and Twitter.  Our analysis is 
based on a unique set of data that captures the activity of the two campaigns on these two 
channels over a fourteen-month period ranging from August 2013 up until the referendum in 
September 2014. Our objective is to threefold: 1) to examine the trends in engagement with 
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social media over the course of the referendum campaign; 2) to establish which campaign 
generated more enthusiasm online over the course of the referendum campaign; 3) To discuss 
of some of the potential reasons as to why particular patterns took hold.  
 
Our analysis shows that as the campaign progressed, more and more people engaged with the 
campaign online, with the peak of interest occurring in the final three weeks of the campaign. 
Engagement on social media was particularly salient around the time of two TV debates 
between the main sides. We also find that the Yes campaign, on the surface at least, 
generated greater online enthusiasm for its campaign than the No side. We discuss a number 
of potential reasons for this, including some referendum specific reasons why the Yes side 
was able to come out on top. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: we first provide an overview of the 2014 independence 
referendum in Scotland. We then detail our data, followed by an in-depth discussion of our 
empirical findings. We then discuss a number of potential reasons that could explain why we 
observed the patterns of behaviour we did, including advancing some referendum specific 
explanations. The chapter concludes with a summary of our findings as well as some 
suggestions for future research.   
 
The 2014 Scottish independence referendum  
The question of Scottish independence came on to the political agenda with a vengeance as 
the pro-secessionist Scottish National Party (SNP) won 11 seats in the UK parliament in the 
1974 Westminster elections. While the fortunes of the SNP have ebbed and flowed since that 
election (Cairney 2011), the independence question has remained omnipresent with the 
presence of the Scottish National Party, resulting in Scotland having a distinct political 
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system (Kellas 1984; McCrone and Paterson 2002; Keating 2010). Although public opinion 
polls pre-2014 had never shown even close to a majority in favour of Scottish secession 
(Curtice 2013), the creation of a Scottish Parliament in 1999 provided the SNP with a 
platform for illustrating competence in  governance as a way of illustrating in small part what 
might be possible given independence. 
 
Indeed, the independence question took on renewed significance in the aftermath of the 2011 
Scottish parliament elections, when the Scottish National Party were re-elected to power with 
DPDMRULW\JRYHUQPHQW:KLOHWKH613¶VYLFWRU\DSSHDUVWRKDYHEHHQGUiven more by 
6FRWWLVKYRWHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKH613¶VFRPSHWHQFHLQUXQQLQJWKH6FRWWLVKJRYHUQPHQW
rather than any particular burning desire for Scottish independence (Johns et al. 2011, 2013), 
the majority result provided legitimacy to the granting of an independence vote.  
 
The referendum was confirmed in October 2012 when the UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron and the Scottish First Minister and leader of the SNP Alex Salmond signed the 
µ(GLQEXUJK$JUHHPHQW¶JUDQWLQJWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWWKHSRZHUWRKROGDUHIerendum by 
asking a single question of Scottish voters. Even before the signing of the Edinburgh 
Agreement, both sides had actually launched official campaigns in the summer of 2012. An 
eighteen-month intensive campaign was initiated following the announcement of the 
referendum question in March 2013. The campaign was dominated by a range of issues 
UDQJLQJIURP6FRWODQG¶VUROHLQWKH(8LQWKHHYHQWRILQGHSHQGHQFH7ULGHQWDQGQXFOHDU
defences, to welfare cuts and austerity. However, the principal issue at hand was the economy 
ZLWKGHEDWHEHWZHHQERWKVLGHVRQ6FRWODQG¶VFRQWLQXHGXVHRIWKH%ULWLVKSRXQGLQWKHHYHQW
of independence, the division of debt between Scotland and the rest of the UK in the event of 
independence, associated revenues from oil, and the impact of independence on employment 
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and industry.2 When asked about being worse off or better off, YouGov polling evidence 
throughout 2014 consistently showed that more people thought that both Scotland and their 
own fortunes would be worse off in an independent Scotland.3 
 
As to how the public received information, social media was arguably central to the Scottish 
campaign. There was substantial activity on Twitter and Facebook related to the referendum, 
particularly in the final 30 days of the campaign. Between 2013 and 2014, there were 5.4 
PLOOLRQWZHHWVXVLQJWKHµLQG\UHI¶(Cellan-Jones 2014) and hashtags associated with the 
independence referendum ended up trending heavily in the final week of the campaign, at one 
stage even comprising eight out of 10 top hashtag trends in Glasgow for example.4 
Meanwhile, on Facebook, there were 10 million interactions alone relating to the referendum 
in the five weeks preceding the vote.5Afterwards, the potency of social media in the 
campaign was illustrated by research from pollster YouGov, which suggested that 54% of 
people got general information on the issues from social media, and when asked what 
information had influenced their decision in the referendum, 39% said information from 
social media and the web (Haggerty 2014). Furthermore, 11% of Scots claimed to have taken 
part in discussions related to the referendum online, more than those who said they attended a 
public meeting during the campaign, or indeed joined either of them (TNS Global 2014). 
Indeed, even if a person tried avoiding social media, by accident or design during the 
campaign, what took place online often became the lead story for traditional news itself. This 
was illustrated by numerous occurrences of stories generated by the online abuse meted out to 
prominent politicians and donors on both sides of the campaign, for example, Nicola 
Sturgeon (a central Yes politician) and JK Rowling (a major No donor).6 As such, there is a 
strong case to be made that even if every single member of the electorate was not consuming 
and/or engaging online, they were nonetheless indirectly confronted with what was taking 
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place online (for e.g.: (Geser 2011; Maireder and Schlögl 2014), heightening the importance 
of a focus of the online trajectory of both campaigns.  
 
Polls throughout this long campaign consistently showed the No side holding a lead, although 
this lead began to subside in summer 2014. The final fortnight resulted in a flurry of activity 
on both sides as the polls started to suggest that the result would be much closer than first 
thought, with two polls even suggesting that Scotland would vote yes.7  
 
However, on 18 September 2014 voters in Scotland went to the polls and were asked: 
³6KRXOG6FRWODQGEHDQLQGHSHQGHQWFRXQWU\"´ Fifty-five percent of voters in Scotland voted 
no and in favour of remaining part of the United Kingdom on a massive turnout of 84.6% of 
voters (Electoral Management Board for Scotland 2014). While we know what happened in 
the polls, we are interested in exploring the state of the two campaigns on social media over 
the course of the campaign. Was there also a surge to Yes on social media and how might we 
account for this? 
 
Data and measures 
Our analysis is based on the tracking of social media activity of the two main campaigns in 
the 2014 Scottish referendum, namely the Yes Scotland campaign that argued for a yes vote 
in the referendum, and the Better Together campaign, which campaigned for a no vote. We 
PRQLWRUHGHDFKFDPSDLJQ¶VRIILFLDO)DFHERRNDQG7ZLWWHUDFFRXQWVFKRRVLQJWKHVHWZR
forms of social media as we expected these two channels above all others would be most 
likely to engender the widest connection to, and interest from, the public. For Facebook, we 
VSHFLILFDOO\PRQLWRUHGWKHQXPEHURIOLNHVHDFKFDPSDLJQ¶V)DFHERRNSDJHUHFHLYHGDQGWKH
QXPEHURISHRSOHWDONLQJDERXWHDFKFDPSDLJQ¶VSDJH8 For Twitter, we collected the number 
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of Twitter followers each account boasted as well as the number of Tweets it had posted by 
that particular day. Our unique set of data was collected each weekday during the period 
August 2013 until the end of September 2014.  
 
We suggest that these metrics can be divided into different themes, namely those indicating 
support/interest in the campaigns and those illustrating a deeper engagement with the 
FDPSDLJQ/LNLQJWKH)DFHERRNSDJHRIWKHFDPSDLJQRUIROORZLQJRQHRIWKHFDPSDLJQ¶V
twitter accounts are indicators of support or interest in that campaign. On the other hand, our 
intensity/engagement measures require a greater level of effort either on the part of the 
FDPSDLJQDVPHDVXUHGE\WKHQXPEHURI7ZHHWVHPDQDWLQJIURPLW¶VDFFRXQWRURQWKHSDUW
RIWKHXVHU:HPHDVXUHWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLF¶VLQWHQVLW\HQgagement by examining how much 
WKH)DFHERRNSDJHRIHDFKFDPSDLJQZDVµWDONHGDERXW¶This latter metric measures how 
PXFKSHRSOHDUHLQWHUDFWLQJZLWKHDFKRIWKHFDPSDLJQ¶VSDJHVIRUH[DPSOHE\
commenting/sharing a wall post, or tagging a photo.  
 
Empirical analysis 
A review of the wealth of data over the thirteen-month period has enabled us to identify three 
distinct patterns of behaviour during the campaign depicted in our figures by three different 
shaded background blocks. The first of these periods runs from the Summer of 2013 until 
1RYHPEHUDQGWKHODXQFKRIWKH6FRWWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VZKLWHSDSHURQ6FRWWLVK
Independence, a period which is characterised by offline hegemony for BT and a mixed 
online battle. The second is the period between November 2013 and May 2014, a period in 
which the Yes campaign pulled ahead noticeably from the BT campaign. And finally, a third 
period, which runs from May 2014 until polling day, 18 September 2014, in which we 
observe an online tsunami of support for the Yes campaign. 
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Period I: Fairly close social media horse race (August 2013 to November 2013) 
 
Figure 1 charts the extent of support (total numbers of Facebook likes and Twitter followers)   
for the two campaigns over a fifteen-month period, between August 2013 and September 
2014.  
Overall totals of Facebook likes for both the Yes Scotland (YS) and Better Together (BT) 
campaigns increased by approximately 30,000 between August and November 2013 
(approximately 76,000 to 106,000 for YS and approximately 66,000 to 96,000 for BT). For 
the first period (August 2013 to November 2013), the volume of Facebook likes and Twitter 
followers was quite similar for both campaigns, albeit there was one noticeable blip on 
Facebook in mid-September 2013 suggesting a change in momentum towards BT. As Figure 
1 illustrates, the BT campaign did manage to reduce the gap in Facebook support marginally 
ULJKWDIWHUWKHRQH\HDUPDUNIURPWKHUHIHUHQGXP7KLVµ\HDUWRJR¶PLlestone coincided with 
WKHODXQFKRQ6HSWHPEHURIDFDPSDLJQFDOOHGµ0LG-0RUQLQJ6HVVLRQV¶WKHSXUSRVH
of which was to encourage BT supporters to step up their online activities by referring their 
friends on Facebook and Twitter to the BT campaign. However, closure in the gap was short-
lived, and the YS campaign maintained its lead through this period (undulating and varying 
between just under 6,000 likes difference in mid-September 2013 and just under 10,000 likes 
difference in both August and November 2013).  
 
On Twitter, YS also had noticeably more followers on Twitter than BT, and unlike Facebook 
likes, Twitter followers showed evidence that online support for YS was consistently pulling 
ahead of the BT campaign as YS pulled in twice as many new followers as BT over this 
period. In August 2013, YS had just over 21,000 followers versus just under 13,000 for BT. 
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By the end of November, YS had over 26,000 followers compared with just over 15,000 for 
BT. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 2 explores the extent of support for the two campaigns over a fifteen-month period, 
between August 2013 and September 2014. The figure depicts the difference in the number 
RIOLNHVEHWZHHQWKH<HV6FRWODQGFDPSDLJQ¶V)DFHERRNSDJHDQGWKH%HWWHU7RJHWKHU
FDPSDLJQ¶V)DFHERRk page (as illustrated by the orange line). It also shows the difference in 
the number of Twitter followers for each campaign, illustrated by the green line. In sum, the 
Yes Scotland campaign had an advantage in the number of Facebook likes and Twitter 
folORZHUVLWKDGIRULW¶VFDPSDLJQIURPWKHRXWVHW:KLOHWKLVZDVDQDGYDQWDJHWKDWWKH<HV
Scotland campaigns were never to lose throughout the entire campaign, as Figure 1 shows, in 
this early period of the campaign, the differences between the two campaigns was quite 
marginal suggesting a close horse race. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Figures 3 and 4 depict level of engagement with the two campaigns according to the number 
RIWZHHWVRQ7ZLWWHUDQGWKHµWDONHGDERXW¶PHWULFRQ)DFHERRNUHVSHFWLYHO\,QWHUHVWLQJO\ 
BT were consistently ahead of YS in the number of tweets that were posted between August 
2013 and November 2013. That said, the margin of difference was consistently being closed 
by YS, so that a BT advantage of more than 1,200 extra Tweets per day in August 2013, was 
almost halved by the end of November 2013 (see figure 3).  




favour of YS than BT (for example, in August 2013 YS were at approximately 8,000 
compared to approximately 5,000 for BT), except on a couple of occasions in early October 
2013 when BT surpassed YS. However, proportionately, this lead is arguably more 
impressive than the lead for likes.  Also, compared with the number of Facebook likes, the 
µWDONHGDERXW¶PHWULFLVDPRUHSUHFLVHLQGLFDWRURIKRZPXFKSHRSOHDUHHQJDJLQJZLWKWKH
campaigns.   
 
,QLWLDOO\WKH<6FDPSDLJQZDVWKHPRUHµWDONHGDERXW¶UHDFKLQJDSHDNDWWKHWLPHRIWKH8.
party conference season in September 2013. However, the BT campaign did appear to gain 
some short-lived traction in its favour at the beginning of October, when it was making a 
concerted effort to focus attention on what would happen to the currency and to taxes in an 
independent Scotland and when it launched several regional campaigns. The YS campaign 
then succeeded in regaining momentum following the 2013 SNP annual conference. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
In sum, the campaign period from August 2013 until November 2013 suggests a close horse 
race on social media. While YS were behind (but closing) in terms of the volume of tweets, 
the other metrics of engagement and support suggest a steady, but slight, lead on average for 
the YS campaign. 
 
3HULRG,,7KHODXQFKRIµ6FRWODQG¶V)XWXUH¶DQGWKHULVHRIWKH<HV campaign online despite 
dire warnings over the currency and EU membership (November 2013 to May 2014) 
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The referendum campaign intensified considerably online following the launch of 
the Scottish *RYHUQPHQW¶V White Paper on independence (aka µ6FRWODQG¶V Future¶ on 26 
November 2013. It is very noticeable from this point that the solid and consistent Yes 
Scotland (YS) lead in terms of support, at least on Facebook, began to widen. At the launch 
of 6FRWODQG¶V Future, the YS Facebook page had been averaging around 8,000 more likes 
than the BT campaign. After the launch the gap between the two campaigns started to grow, 
and edged up considerably over the next six months, to an extent that by the end of May 2014 
YS were ahead of BT by just over 30,000 Facebook likes (see Figures 1 and 2). The YS 
campaign also gained more Twitter followers than BT during this period. From the end of 
November 2013 to the end of May 2014, the gap steadily doubled from a 10,000 advantage 
over BT to well over a 20,000 lead with YS having nearly double the followers (45,000 to 
23,000 ± see Figures 1 and 2). This represents an important development in which YS were 
developing a much larger network of tweeters and re-tweeters of the yes to independence 
campaign messages.  
 
Moreover, by the middle of March 2014, YS started to tweet more than BT for the first time 
(see Figure 3), and this lead has been extended. Figure 3 charts the number of tweets 
emanating from each campaLJQ¶VDFFRXQWDQGE\WKHHQGRI0D\<6KDGWZHHWHGPRUH
than 500 more times than BT (4,930 times compared to 4,393 respectively). The YS 
FDPSDLJQZDVDOVRPRUHFRQVLVWHQWO\µWDONHGDERXW¶RQDYHUDJHWKDQWKH%7FDPSDLJQGXULQJ
this period (see Figure 4). Of the 105 daily data time points we have during this period, the 
BT campaign was the more talked about on only 13 occasions. Indeed, as the purple line 
shows for this period, despite two fairly substantial swings towards BT, the overall trend was 
one of upward growth for YS. On the two main occasions when momentum swung back to 
the BT camp, this followed concerns raised by European Commission President Jose Manuel 
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Barroso over the possibility of Scottish membership of the EU as well as Chancellor George 
Osborne insisting that a currency union was not possible in the event of independence (both 
LQ)HEUXDU\DQGWKHUHOHDVHRIDUHSRUWE\0RRG\¶VRQWKHFKDOOHQJLQJILQDQFLDO
implications of independence in May 2014.    
 
Period III: Official campaign period, impact of events and an overall online tsunami towards 
Yes (May 2014 to September 2014) 
 
The official campaign period (a 16 week period from 30 May 2014 to 18 September 2014) 
saw the online and offline campaigns in full swing. Offline activities included: door-to-door 
canvassing; leafleting; parades; street bands; creative art projects; banners; posters; the 
sporting of lapel badges and T-shirts, as well as countless interventions from industry figures, 
politicians, and celebrities, and two set piece televised debates between the two campaign 
leaders. Online campaign activity increased too, especially following the two TV leader 
debates. 
 
What is most noticeable during the official campaign period is that online support for YS 
literally took off compared with BT (see Figures 1, 2, and 3). The only very slight aberration 
to this coincided with the first television debate between the two campaign leaders, on 5 
August 2014 when an ICM poll for The Guardian newspaper found that Alistair Darling (BT) 
µZRQ¶WKHGHEDWHZLWK$OH[6DOPRQG<6E\WR9 That said, in terms of Facebook 
likes YS extended its lead over BT from 27,000 at the end of May 2014 to over 109,000 by 
the day of the referendum (see Figures 1 and 2). Similarly, the YS lead in terms of Twitter 
followers jumped from 22,000 at the end of May 2014 to over 68,000 by the day of the 
referendum (see Figures 1 and 2).  
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In relation to campaign Tweets, the final numbers of Tweets (8354 for YS and 5740 for BT) 
suggested a ratio of 41 per cent for BT versus 59 per cent for YS (see Figure 3). The volume 
of tweeting by YS increased significantly during the official campaign period, and moreover 
increased more than it did for BT. This arguably matters because if you are giving your 
supporters comparably more tweets to re-tweet and share on other sites such as Facebook, 
then your potential for both audience reach and message control is arguably going to be much 
greater. 
 
Interestingly, before September 2014 very few public opinion polls were in the 40s for Yes, 
whereas during September only one poll out of 19 was not in the 40s. In turn, there was a 
clear shift in public mood and volume of support for Yes in September and our online data 
arguably detect this momentum slightly ahead of time as depicted by the steepening curves of 
ERWK)DFHERRNOLNHVDQG7ZLWWHUµ)ROORZHUV¶GXULQJWKHRIILFLDOFDPSDLJQSHULRGDQGLQ
particular following the 2nd TV debate on 25 August 2014 in which Alex Salmond (leader of 
the SNP and main face of YS) was deemed the winner over Alistair Darling (a prominent 
Scottish Labour politician and leader of the BT campaign). Arguably compounding the 
leverage of this second debate performance was the airing of the so-FDOOHGµ3DWURQLVLQJ%7
/DG\¶WHOHYLVLRQFRPPHUFLDOLQZKLFKDhypothetical uninformed middle-class house-wife 
talked herself into voting no0XFKSDURGLHGIRUH[DPSOHµPDIULGJHPDJQHWVWROGPHWR
YRWH1R¶WKHFRPPHUFLDOZDVZLGHO\GHULGHGDVEHLQJDPDOHFUHDWLRQUHSUHVHQWLQJDQRWKHU
era.10 In turn, it arguably alienated many female voters and represented a spectacular misfire 
for the BT campaign.     
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However not all of the social media metrics pointed so clearly towards a Yes victory. The 
)DFHERRNµWDONHGDERXW¶PHWULFVHH)LJXUHZDVLnteresting in that despite a general upward 
trend for YS, there were two clear time points when the momentum swung dramatically back 
to the BT campaign117KHILUVWSUHFLSLWRXVVZLQJWRZDUGV%7IROORZHGWKHILUVWOHDGHUV¶79
debate on 5 August 2015, in which pundits generally thought BT leader Alistair Darling 
outperformed YS leader Alex Salmond. The second swing towards BT was huge (see Figure 
4) and occurred during the last week of the campaign. Following public opinion polls 
suggesting a last minute move towards Yes (as well as evidence from our blog on the online 
tsunami that was taking place12) there was a last minute flurry of activity from the three main 
Westminster parties and leaders who rushed north to rally the cause in Scotland. What 
manifested was ZKDWWKHPHGLDODEHOOHGDµYRZ¶IRUPRUHSRZHUVWR6FRWODQGWKDQ1RKDG
EHHQZLOOLQJWRFRXQWHQDQFHEHIRUHKDQGDOEHLWZKDWWKLVµYRZ¶PHDQWYDULHGDFURVVWKH
parties making up the No camp), as well as an outpouring of numerous warnings from many 
prominent business and industry players of the implications of a yes vote in the closing days. 
Ex-Labour Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, also delivered what was widely perceived to be 
the speech of his life in the closing days of the campaigns and the BT campaign finally tried 
to reclaim brand Scotland through the use of red heart balloons and logos with Scotland 
written all over them.  
 
Most importantly, what our data show, especially in this final period, is that events very much 
appear to be driving online activities. This finding nicely supports research by others such as 
Rossman et al.(2014) who found surges in Twitter activities around the time of the TV debates 
between the two Chancellor candidates in the 2013 German election, a pattern which is very much 





Understanding patterns of social media behaviour in the campaign 
There are a number of possible reasons for Yes having carved a decisive lead online. Our 
starting framework is that social media in a referendum campaign is likely to result in the Yes 
side having a positive advantage because the medium is such that social media favours 
µSRVLWLYHPHVVDJHV¶)RULQVWDQFHLWLVLQYDULDEO\HDVLHUWRµOLNH¶ a positive Facebook post of 
VD\DSDUW\WKDQLWLVWRµOLNH¶DQHJDWLYHSRVWRIVD\DFDUDFFLGHQW\RXPLJKWKDYHEHHQLQ
7KLVLVDUJXDEO\HYHQPRUHWKHFDVHZKHQWKLVDOVRUHODWHVWRRQH¶VRZQFRXQWU\IRUH[DPSOH
Yes to Independence, or even Yes to Scotland) than to like a negative position (for example, 
No to Independence, which could feasibly be perceived, or misperceived, as No to Scotland).  
 
Second, it could be that those backing the Yes side were simply more engaged in their 
campaign than were the No supporters. Consequently, Yes supporters may have been more 
likely than No supporters to express their views in a public forum. Indeed, a June 2014 poll 
by TNS BMRB showed that Yes supporters were three times more likely to have discussed 
the independence question online (TNS BMRB, 2014).  Another potential issue to consider is 
the observation of Michael Keating that the campaign ground war favoured the Yes side 
because the No campaign included two parties that were weak in Scotland, the Conservative 
and Liberal Democrats, meaning that much of the ground war was left to only one of three 
parties on the BT side, Labour (Keating, 2014). It was also difficult for the No side to present 
coherence given the slightly different flavours of No on offer, not to mention the rather 
incredulous position of having the two main opposing parties at General Elections at the UK 
level seemingly on the same page as each other in the referendum. Indeed, this was a gift for 
the Yes side as Labour could be lDEHOOHGDVµUHG7RULHV¶DODEHOWKDWSHUVLVWHGDQGWKDW
ultimately hurt Scottish Labour in the UK General Election in 2015).  
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Third, data show that younger age groups are more likely to be involved online than older age 
groups. A 2013 Eurobarometer survey, for example, illustrated that 28% of EU citizens on 
average said they had expressed their view on a public issue online or through social media in 
the past two years (Eurobarometer Flash, 2013). This figure rose to 39% for individuals under 
the age of 40. Given that we now know that more young people voted for independence than 
against it13, we would expect greater support and engagement for the YS campaign on 
average as a result. 
 
Furthermore, in a high stakes election such as the independence referendum in which fear of 
misinformation was omnipresent, social media offered the capacity for many on both sides to 
seek out information, although many would argue that social media was a source for 
misinformation to be spread too. In particular, those advocating independence arguably had a 
means to by-pass traditional media formats that, to many within the Yes camp, were 
perceived as inbuilt defenders of the status quo in both name (for example, British 
Broadcasting Company) and content (see for example, the protests outside the BBC in the 
days running up to the referendum). For many on the Yes side in particular, social media 
became not just a means to share information and to rally the troops to attend and support 
events14, but also a means to correct perceived bias in more traditional media formats (see for 
example, focus group research of Carvalho and Winters (forthcoming).  
 
Conclusion and discussion 
Our chapter has explored the interplay of social media in a referendum campaign. The 2014 
Scottish referendum could indeed be classified as µthe first social media referendum¶. Our 
contribution has specifically measured the extent of enthusiasm each campaign generated online 
and has examined the interplay between events and online support. Our contribution shows that the 
Yes campaign generated a greater degree of enthusiasm online. We speculate as to a number of 
reasons why that may have occurred including some referendum specific factors ranging from: it 
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is easier to like a positive (vote yes) than a negative (vote no); YS were more engaged online and 
more united; YS had the benefit of more younger supporters who are more active on average online; 
and YS turned to social media as a reaction to the perceived bias of the content of traditional news 
sources. Our analysis also illustrates that certain events in the course of the campaign did appear to 
have an impact in terms of generating enthusiasm and interest in the online campaigns of both sides 
including the launch of the White Paper on Scottish independence in November 2013, the TV 
debates between Alex Salmond and Alistair Darling, and in the final week, the publication of an 
opinion poll suggesting a yes victory. Accordingly, what we can say is that engagement with online 
campaigns appears to be driven by events, illustrating that behaviour observed on social media 
seems to be strongly influenced by specific newsworthy items.   
 
Given the final electoral outcome, three of our online metrics (Facebook likes, Twitter 
followers, and Tweets) were arguably in a converse relationship with what took place as 55 
per cent of voters voted no and 45 per cent voted yes. Consequently, you could argue that 
Facebook likes and Twitter followers and volume of Tweets by the two campaigns were not a 
very good predictor of the final referendum outcome. However, what is arguably more 
interesting is the nature of the relationship between the shift in online fortunes of YS with the 
change in offline fortunes of the YS campaign.  
 
To conclude, while it is impossible to infer any form of causation without taking into account 
a multitude of other factors, it is at least noteworthy that increased online activity and overall 
online trends for the two campaigns often preceded subsequent increased support for Scottish 
independence in the polls. No may have won the independence referendum, but our data 
generally suggested momentum was moving to Yes, which it was, and which the final result 
is testament to if we contrast this with where Yes were a year out from the referendum. Yes 
went from nowhere to somewhere, and the online data is arguably useful in detecting this 
development before the opinion polls. Nonetheless, it should be evident that the YHVVLGH¶V
advantage in generating online enthusiasm was not sufficient for victory. While this might at face 
value indicate that online activity can tell us little about movements in general public opinion, we 
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have at least demonstrated that the surge in support for the yes campaign among the general 
public was preceded by a rally in support online, which at least suggests that online activity might 
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 Figure 2 Differences in Facebook and twitter support levels for both campaigns - YS 
campaign total minus BT campaign total (August 2013 to September 2014). Please note: a 





Figure 3 Social media intensity of engagement by the campaigns: number of cumulative 
tweets from each campaign (August 2013 to September 2014) 
 
 
Figure 4 Social media intensity of engagement by the public with social media campaigns: 
difference in the number of people talking about each of the campaigns (August 2013 to 
September 2014). Please note: a positive score indicates an advantage for YS campaign. A 
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